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MAPPING THE DIGITAL PUBLIC
DOMAIN: THREATS AND
OPPORTUNITIES
PAMELA SAMUELSON*
I
INTRODUCTION
Whether the public domain is a virtual wasteland of undeserving detritus or
the font of all new creation is the subject of some debate.1  Those who adhere to
the former perspective do not worry about “threats” to this domain any more
than they would worry about scavengers who go to garbage dumps to look for
abandoned property.  Adherents of the latter view, interestingly enough, are
not of one mind about “threats” to this domain.  Some believe that propertizing
value residing in the public domain will produce more social benefit than letting
content languish there,2 while others regard propertization itself as the main
threat to the public domain.3
At the risk of seeming a contrarian, I concur with all three views: some of
what is in the public domain is detritus; some of what is valuable in the public
domain might be better utilized if propertized to some degree; other parts of
the public domain need to remain open and unownable as sources for future
creations.  In the course of explaining why I embrace this seemingly contradic-
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1. Among those who seem to adhere to the former characterization are BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN
UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 45-46 (1967) and Robert DeNicola, Copyright in Collections of
Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 521-22 (1981).
Among those who adhere to the latter are JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, & SPLEENS at x-xi
(1998) and Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 968 (1990).
2. See, e.g., Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub nom. Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002), and cert. amended, 534 U.S. 1160 (2002) (suggesting that more works
will be available if copyright terms are lengthened than if the works go into the public domain);
JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 77 (2001) (quoting Jack Valenti of the Motion Picture Asso-
ciation of America as saying that “[a] public domain work is an orphan,” an observation that would
seem to provide a rationale for perpetual protection for motion pictures).
3. See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 1, at 125-43; Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air To Common Use:
First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 397 (1999);
David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 147 (Autumn 1981).
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tory perspective, I will offer a map of the public domain.4  This map is a useful
prelude to a discussion of possible impacts of various legal and policy
developments affecting the digital public domain.  Some initiatives would have
adverse effects on the digital public domain, while others may not.  This article
will identify a number of threats to the public domain that deserve attention.  It
will also celebrate contributions that digitalization and digital networks have
made in extending the public domain and enabling projects to preserve the digi-
tal commons.  In some respects, digital information and digital networks have
made the public domain more vibrant and robust, and if various digital com-
mons initiatives attain their goals, the public domain may flourish as never
before.
II
MAPPING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AS AN AID TO UNDERSTANDING
ITS PRESENT STATE IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT
The public domain has been, for the most part, an uncharted terrain.  Some-
times it seems an undifferentiated blob of unnamed size and dimensions.5  More
often, discourse about the public domain focuses on one, or a small number, of
its component parts or traits.6  As a number of scholars have recognized, the
public domain consists, in fact, of a vast and diverse assortment of contents.7
The public domain is, moreover, different sizes at different times and in differ-
ent countries.8  Sometimes the public domain grows, as when patents or copy-
rights expire, or as in the aftermath of decisions such as Feist Publications, Inc.
v. Rural Telephone Service, which held that uncreative compilations of facts
4. The idea of mapping the public domain is not original to me, but rather to Laurel Jamtgaard,
formerly a Boalt student and now a practicing lawyer, who proposed to write a paper on this subject on
the theory that such a map might prove fruitful in analysis of public domain issues.
5. See, e.g., Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 137, 137 (1993) (public domain is what remains when all forms of protected information are
taken into account).
6. See, e.g., Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intel-
lectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1168-76
(2000) (arguing that the Copyright Term Extension Act is unconstitutional, as was earlier legislation
restoring copyrights in foreign works that had been consigned to the public domain by U.S. formality
requirements prior to 1989); Paul J. Heald, Reviving the Rhetoric of the Public Interest: Choir Directors,
Copy Machines, and New Arrangements of Public Domain Music, 46 DUKE L.J. 241 (1996) (discussing
illegitimate claims of derivative work copyrights in public domain music); Arti Rai, Regulating Scientific
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999) (express-
ing concern about efforts to propertize human genome data).
7. See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 1, at 209 n.8; Litman, supra note 1, at 992-95.
8. Some things are in the public domain in one country but not another.  Some countries, such as
the United Kingdom, allow copyright protection for laws and other government works, whereas U.S.
law precludes this.  See 17 U.S.C. §105 (2002).  Some categories of intellectual creations that once were
in the public domain are now subject to intellectual property rights.  Compare 17 U.S.C. §102(a) (archi-
tectural works are listed as among the original works of authorship protected under the Copyright Act
of 1976, as amended) with 17 U.S.C. §5 (repealed 1976) (listing protectable subject matters of copyright
protection under the Copyright Act of 1909, now superceded, a list that did not include architectural
works).
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cannot be protected by U.S. copyright law. 9  Sometimes it shrinks, as when the
European Union promulgated a directive requiring EU member states to pro-
tect the contents of databases10 or when U.S. courts decided that business meth-
ods could be patented.11  The public domain also has some murky areas.  For
example, some intellectual creations are, in theory, in the public domain, but for
all practical purposes, do not really reside there.12  Although I define the public
domain as a sphere in which contents are free from intellectual property rights,
there is another murky terrain near the boundaries of the public domain con-
sisting of some intellectual creations that courts have treated as in the public
domain for some, but not all, purposes.13
Across the border from the public domain are several categories of content
that are so widely usable that, for practical purposes, they seem to be part of the
public domain.14  This includes, importantly, much content that is technically
protected by copyright law but is widely available to the public, as when it is
posted on publicly accessible web sites available to all comers without fee or
apparent restrictions on use.  Also outside the public domain in theory, but
seemingly inside in effect, are such things as open source software; a penumbra
of privileged uses under fair use, experimental use, and other copyright rules
that permit unlicensed uses and sharing of information to take place; and stan-
dards that are licensed without payment of royalties.15  Also at the perimeter of
the public domain are works whose intellectual property rights are on the verge
of expiring and, arguably, some creations that are about to be made—such as a
new computer programming language or the solution to a longstanding mathe-
matical problem—that, once they exist, will be part of the public domain. In the
map below, the public domain is akin to its own nation-state.  Various catego-
ries of public domain information are akin to regions of that nation.  The con-
tents of each category are akin to the cities or villages within that region that, in
turn, have populations of various sizes.  Some artifacts may reside in more than
9. 499 U.S. 340, 363-64 (1991).
10. Council Directive 96/9 of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L
77), 20 [hereinafter EU Database Directive].
11. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Servs., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Policy-makers in the European Union have decided not to follow the United States in this respect.
12. A painting from the mid-nineteenth century that remains in a private collection or was
destroyed in a fire is, in theory, in the public domain as a matter of copyright law, but its non-public
nature or its destruction mean that it may, in fact, be there only in theory.
13. See, e.g., Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(holding that illustrations from Beatrix Potter’s Peter Rabbit stories were in the public domain as a
matter of copyright law, but were nonetheless protected by trademark law when a competing publisher
included the illustrations in its books).
14. Some commentators consequently treat some of these contiguous areas as part of the public
domain.  See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 3, at 358 n.16 (treating fair uses as part of the public domain).
15. Until very recently, the World Wide Web Consortium had a policy of standardizing on pat-
ented technologies only if they were licensed on a no-royalty basis for W3C purposes.  A change in the
W3C policy that would allow royalty-bearing licenses has generated some controversy. See, e.g., Ken-
dall Grant Clark, Patents, Royalties, and the Future of the Web, O’REILLEY XML.COM, Oct. 10, 2001, at
http://www.xml.com/pub/a/2001/10/10/patents-web-future.html.
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one “town;” for example, a scientific article may contain three or four catego-
ries of public domain contents.
Mapping the public domain and contiguous terrains is useful for several rea-
sons.  First, it can help in an assessment of the likely impacts of certain devel-
opments on the public domain, such as the digitization of information and the
development of global digital networks.  Second, the map can be a tool for cali-
brating the extent to which a particular legal or policy initiative may affect the
public domain, either in a positive or negative way.  Some legal and policy ini-
tiatives, as we shall see, have broader and more serious potential impacts than
others.  Third, it can contribute to an analysis of which among the contents of
the public domain are detritus (for example, grocery lists), which are gems (for
example, Mozart symphonies), which are among the constitutionally core ele-
ments of the public domain (for example, scientific principles), which elements
are there more by chance than design or necessity (for example, exercises), and
which of the public domain’s contents will be most harmed if propertized (for
example, information).
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FIGURE 1:
A MAP OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
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That digitization of information can have a very positive impact on the
effective existence of the public domain is readily apparent.  To the extent sci-
entific data are either collected in or transposed into digital form, they can then
be shared and processed more readily than if they remained in paper files in the
basement of a scientist’s lab.16  Global digital networks mean that scientists
from around the world can share data sets and conduct experiments, leading to
discoveries that will contribute to further growth of the public domain.
Similarly, digitization of government information, such as bills pending before
the legislature, government reports, schedules for hearings before legislative
committees or administrative tribunals, and posting of this information on the
Internet makes the information more widely accessible than print equivalents.
This makes the public domain more effective and robust in serving that part of
the public interested in such information.
Digitization of information and the existence of digital networks do not, of
course, necessarily enhance the public domain.  Firms may be able to attain
meaningful exclusive control over digital information that is in the public
domain, both in theory and in law, through technological access controls or
licensing or both.  The LEXIS and Westlaw databases contain hundreds of
thousands of public domain judicial opinions and other legal texts in digital
form that the database owners control both technologically and by licenses.17
Do these technical controls or licenses diminish the public domain?  Some
would argue yes; others would argue no.  Printed forms of these materials are,
for the most part, still widely available without license or technical restrictions,
and they may be a resource for further digitization projects having a non-pro-
prietary character.  Even those who care deeply for the continued existence of
the public domain in legal information would have to admit that no firm could
justify undertaking the very substantial expense of digitizing public domain
legal information and building a database of these contents and software tools
to enable effective use of the database without some way to recoup these
expenses, as through some exercise of exclusive control over the resource.
When Mead Data Central initially made its investments in digitizing judicial
opinions, neither the government nor non-profit organizations had the foresight
or the willingness to undertake such a project.18  Legal scholars have greatly
benefited by the existence of databases such as LEXIS and Westlaw.  These
scholars would be less capable of producing new works and making their own
contributions to the public domain without access to these databases.
16. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, BITS OF POWER: ISSUES IN GLOBAL ACCESS TO
SCIENTIFIC DATA 2-3 (1997).
17. Mead Data Central, a forward-looking paper company, anticipated an era in which digital
information might displace paper.  It started the LEXIS legal database by scanning print copies of the
same cases contained in West Publishing Company’s books of laws and judicial opinions to make digital
source files.
18. West Publishing Company did not initially perceive the market potential for online databases
of legal information.  It introduced its Westlaw database in 1975, nine years after the introduction of
LEXIS.  See About Westlaw, at http://www.westlaw.com/about/?tf=91&tc=0 (last visited Nov. 13, 2002);
About Lexis Nexis, at http://www.lexisnexis.com/about/default.asp (last visited Nov. 13, 2002).
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Concern about restrictions imposed by proprietary databases of legal infor-
mation has, moreover, generated a variety of initiatives to “free” legal informa-
tion from these constraints.  Courts themselves have undertaken to publish
judicial opinions on court web sites.  Legislatures post pending bills.  Certain
law schools, most prominently Cornell, have undertaken to establish non-pro-
prietary databases of key legal information, such as Supreme Court decisions,
open to all comers.19  Some for-profit firms provide open Internet access to dig-
itized legal information without charge in the hopes of attracting customers to
their sites.20  In these and other initiatives, digitization of the information and
the availability of digital networks have been essential components of the strat-
egy for effectively contributing to an enhancement of this aspect of the public
domain.
Should the data in the LEXIS and Westlaw databases be available free on
the Internet without restrictions?  Perhaps so, and this is surely achievable,
although not without cost.  The U.S. government could clearly exercise its emi-
nent domain power to acquire rights to make this information freely available
on the Internet.  But even if the political will could be mustered to do this
(about as likely as Osama bin Laden’s conversion to Christianity), would soci-
ety be better off with a public domain LEXIS?  Who would continue to invest
in maintaining the database, extending it, and improving its tools?  Perhaps
social welfare is enhanced by a mix of digital public domain and proprietary
databases of legal information, with the public domain sites providing some
competition to hold in check the duopolistic tendencies of the market players
and providing access to key information, such as pending bills and Supreme
Court opinions, to those who cannot afford to pay database access fees.
III
THREATS TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT
Threats to the public domain come in different shapes and sizes.  A rela-
tively small, although still significant, incursion on the subset of the public
domain consisting of digital information is represented by the Anti-Cybersquat-
ting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”).21  ACPA extends property rights of
trademark owners in the digital networked environment well beyond the
bounds of trademark law.22  Insofar as ACPA is being used to seize domain
names from legitimate organizations and users, this incursion on the public
domain is troublesome.23  As compared with other initiatives, however, ACPA
19. See, e.g., Legal Information Institute, at http://www.law.cornell.edu (last visited Nov. 13, 2002).
20. See, e.g., FindLaw, at http://www.findlaw.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2002); Bureau of National
Affairs, Inc., at http://www.bna.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2002).
21. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (1999).
22. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and The Internet Domain Name System, 4
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 149, 163 (2000).
23. See Ford v. Great Domains.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 635 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (Ford claimed that a
domain name incorporating the word “jaguar” violated ACPA even though defendant had posted
information on the domain name web site about preserving these animals).
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is a relatively minor threat to the digital public domain.  Its impact only extends
to one subset of the most southern terrain of the public domain map.
A more substantial and differently configured threat to the digital public
domain arose from Congress’ enactment of the Copyright Term Extension Act
(“CTEA”) in 1998.24  Strictly speaking, it was a threat when enacted, but is now
a virtual dam blocking the flow of information into the public domain.  It will
remain so unless a challenge to its constitutionality is eventually successful.25
The CTEA’s incursion on the public domain is more substantial and more eco-
nomically significant than ACPA’s because it affects a larger region of the
public domain, altering the legal status of hundreds of thousands of works for
decades.  Its principal impact may be on non-digital components of the public
domain; in contrast, ACPA’s impact is only in the digital domain.  That the
CTEA impacts the digital public domain can be seen in the thwarted plans of
Eric Eldred to build a digital library of works that, but for the CTEA, would be
in the public domain.26  The CTEA’s raid on the public domain has more consti-
tutional significance than ACPA’s because the constitutional provision that
authorizes Congress to enact intellectual property laws requires limits on the
term of copyright.27
Among the legal initiatives primarily aimed at digital information with
major implications for the public domain are these: the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (“UCITA”),28 the Collections of Information
Anti-Piracy Act (“CIAA”),29 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
(“DMCA”)30 in tandem with its inevitable brother legislation to mandate instal-
24. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C. including §§101-106, 203, 301-304).
25. One legal challenge to the CTEA’s constitutionality has so far been unsuccessful.  See, e.g.,
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), en banc denied sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d
849 (D.C. Cir. 2001). However, one judge dissented from this decision insofar as the CTEA extended
the terms of existing copyrights.  See Eldred, 239 F.3d at 380-83.  The U.S. Supreme Court has granted a
petition for certiorari to hear Eldred’s appeal of this decision. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002),
and cert. amended, 534 U.S. 1160 (2002).
26. See Eldred, 239 F.3d at 374.  Other plaintiffs in the Eldred case were non-digital distributors of
public domain works affected by the CTEA extension.  Id.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8 (exclusive rights may be granted only for “limited times”).  The
characterization of the CTEA as an instance of perpetual copyright on the installment plan derives
from the work of Peter Jaszi.  See The Copyright Term Extension Act: Hearing on S.4839 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. (1995) (statement of Professor Peter Jaszi, Washington
College of Law, American University).  For an analysis of the constitutional deficiencies of the CTEA
by one of the counsel for Eldred, see Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 1057, 1065 (2001).  See also Jane C. Ginsburg, et al., Symposia: The Constitutionality of Copyright
Term Extension: How Long Is Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651 (2000) (expressing
various views on CTEA).
28. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT (UCITA) (2001), available at http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/ucita01.htm.
29. See H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999) (to be codified as 17 U.S.C. §§1401-1408).
30. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C. including §§1201-1204).
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lation of standard technical measures in digital media devices.31  Each of these
initiatives poses threats to the digital public domain that are broader in scope
and scale than those posed by the CTEA.  This is, in part, because of their
implications not just for one region of the public domain map, but for multiple
regions.  Of these initiatives, only the CIAA directly offers protection to what
is, under current law, public domain material.  The other three mainly aim to
give an extra layer of protection to intellectual creations, most of which are
already protected by intellectual property law, although each affects the public
domain and contiguous territories as well.  Before probing each initiative in
detail, it is worth pointing out that there may be synergies amongst these initia-
tives that multiply their effects.  Further magnifying the potential effects of
these legal initiatives are certain non-legal developments such as the formation
of the Secure Digital Music Initiative (“SDMI”) and the DVD Copy Control
Association (“DVD-CCA”) that aim to provide a secure technical infrastruc-
ture to avert leakage of digital works that the law alone would be unable to con-
trol.32
UCITA’s most obvious implications for the digital public domain arise from
its validation of mass-market licenses for computer information.  Pro-CD, Inc.
v. Zeidenberg33—a case decided, it should be said, under state commercial law
rules, not under UCITA—is a widely cited example of the use of mass-market
licenses to undermine the public domain in digital information.34  ProCD manu-
factured and mass-marketed a CD-ROM containing white pages listings from
thousands of telephone directories in digital form.  ProCD could not get copy-
right protection for this compilation because the Supreme Court’s Feist decision
held that the white pages listings of telephone directories are in the public
domain because they consist of facts that copyright law does not protect and
because, as compilations, they lack sufficient originality to qualify for copyright
protection.35  ProCD put a license in the package containing the CD-ROM of
telephone directory information that permitted only personal uses of the data, a
restriction that Zeidenberg violated by posting the contents of ProCD’s disks on
an open site on the Internet.  In the view of the trial judge in the ProCD case
and of many commentators, enforcing this license restriction interfered with
achieving policy objectives of copyright law.36  The appellate court disagreed,
31. See Declan McCullagh , New Copyright Bill Heading to DC, WIRED NEWS, Sept. 7, 2001,
(describing bill to mandate technical measures in digital devices), at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/ 0,1283,46655,00.html.
32. See, e.g., DVD-CCA v. McLaughlin, 2000 WL 48512, *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2000) (describing
DVD-CCA); SDMI challenge FAQ, (discussing the Secure Digital Music Initiative), at
http://www.cs.princeton.edu/sip/sdmi/faq.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2002).
33. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
34. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 93-98 (1997); David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into
Expand, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 17, 42-76 (1999); Maureen O’Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the
ProCD Case: A Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 55-57 (1997).
35. Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362-63 (1991).
36. See ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 658 (W.D. Wis. 1996); Elkin-Koren, supra
note 34, at 63-71.
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asserting that the existence of a contract between ProCD and Zeidenberg dis-
tinguished ProCD’s claim from copyright.37  Because ProCD’s license only cre-
ated rights as between the parties and not rights against the world, the license
did not create rights equivalent to copyright.38
If UCITA’s only impact on the public domain was to protect compilers of
unoriginal data against market-destructive appropriations, there would be little
reason to worry about this law.  In a variety of ways, however, UCITA protects
the interests of purveyors of digital information beyond—and in some respects
in contradiction with—the default rules of intellectual property and other
information laws.  First, UCITA’s willingness to enforce licenses protecting
digital forms of public domain information does not depend on whether this is
necessary to avert market failures.  Second, to the extent that licenses are
drafted to bind subsequent users, the distinction between contract rights that
bind only the two parties to the transaction and property rights that bind the
world erodes significantly.39  Third, in a variety of subtle ways (for example, in
presumptively enforcing confidentiality restrictions as to data that would gener-
ally be deemed “public” by virtue of its being mass-marketed), UCITA aims to
stop leakages of information into the public domain.40  Fourth, UCITA affects
the penumbra of privileged uses lying adjacent to the public domain in signifi-
cant ways.  Under UCITA, the paradigmatic transaction is a license, not a sale.41
This characterization of the transaction affects rights that copyright law confers
on owners of copies of copyrighted content (for example, to make backup
copies of software, to modify software, and to sell or otherwise redistribute
one’s copy of software).42  In addition, UCITA presumes that all license terms
are enforceable without regard to whether they aim to override public policy
limitations on intellectual property rights.43  For example, many software
licenses restrict the right to reverse-engineer computer programs, even though
37. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454.
38. Id.  Commentators have pointed out that preemption analysis can and should consider whether
enforcing the state law would interfere with federal intellectual property policy.  See, e.g., Nimmer et
al., supra note 34, at 40-63.
39. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J.
1125, 1132-33 (2000) (discussing viral contracts).
40. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Do You Want To Know a Trade Secret?  How Article 2B
Will Make Licensing Trade Secrets Easier (But Innovation More Difficult), 87 CALIF. L. REV. 193, 198,
241 (1999).  See also David A. Rice, License With Contract and Precedent: Publisher-Licensor Protec-
tion Consequences and the Rationale Offered for the Nontransferrability of Licenses Under Article 2B,
13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1248-51 (1998).
41. See, e.g., Robert W. Golmulkiewicz, The License Is the Product: Comments on the Promise of
Article 2B for Software and Information Licensing, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 891, 892-902 (1998).
42. See 17 U.S.C. §117.  Licensing has especially important implications for libraries to the extent
that the rightsholder has adopted a “single user license” policy. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 100-04
(2000) (discussing implications for libraries of licensing) [hereinafter DIGITAL DILEMMA].  Similarly, to
the extent that existing consumer protection laws apply to sales of goods, arguably UCITA relieves its
licensors from consumer protection responsibilities.  See, e.g., Jean Braucher, The Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (UCITA): Objectings From the Consumer Perspective (Aug. 15, 2000)
(on file with the author).
43. See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT (UCITA) §105 (2001).
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this activity would be acceptable under trade secrecy and copyright law as a
means to get access to information that, once known, may become part of the
public domain.44  UCITA’s presumption of enforceability may also apply to
clauses in mass market licenses that direct the licensee not to criticize or reveal
flaws in the licensed computer information, 45 which affects the legal status of
many uses of information at the borders of the public domain.
There are, however, several ways in which the public interest in balanced
licensing rules may be protected even if UCITA is, over time, more widely
adopted than now.  First, section 105 of UCITA recognizes the possibility that
courts may rule some license provisions conflict with federal law or otherwise
violate fundamental public policies, and insofar as they do, they may be unen-
forceable.46  Courts may interpret this broadly and not enforce anti-reverse-
engineering clauses or license restrictions on public domain information when
there is no danger of market failure.  Second, courts may invoke other legal
doctrines, such as misuse of intellectual property rights and First Amendment
values, to limit the enforceability of computer information licenses in appropri-
ate cases.47  This, too, may enable reuse of public domain information.  Third,
new legal doctrines may emerge in the case-law, such as “fair breach” of
licenses to reach similar results under UCITA licenses as under copyright’s fair
use doctrine.48  Fourth, the desire of licensors to impose unreasonable restraints
on users by means of licenses may be held in check to some degree by market
forces.49
How much comfort one should take in these checks on UCITA licenses is
hard to gauge, given that UCITA essentially allows vendors of computer infor-
mation to give themselves more rights than intellectual property law would and
to avoid the burdens of public interest limitations.50  Licensor restrictions are
guarded, under UCITA, by a heavy presumption in favor of enforceability; this
presumption can only be overturned after lengthy and expensive litigation that
44. See, e.g., David McGowan, Free Contracting, Fair Competition, and Article 2B: Some Reflec-
tions on Federal Competition Policy, Information Transactions, and “Aggressive Neutrality,” 13
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1173, 1195-96 (1998).  For more general expressions of concern about UCITA
licenses and fair uses, see, for example, Charles R. McManis, The Privatization (or Shrinkwrapping) of
American Copyright Law, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 173 (1999); Nimmer et al., supra note 34.  But see Joel
Rothstein Wolfson, Contract and Copyright Are Not at War: A Reply to “The Metamorphosis of Con-
tract into Expand,” 87 CALIF. L. REV. 79 (1999) (arguing that Nimmer and McManis overstate the
potential conflict between licenses and copyright policy).
45. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property
Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 111, 128-29 (1999).
46. UCITA §§105(a), (b).  UCITA §105(c) defers to consumer protection laws to the extent they
apply to computer information.  There is, however, a question as to whether consumer protection laws,
which were drafted to protect consumers in transactions involving sales of goods, apply to licensed
information.
47. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 45, at 151-67.
48. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Without Walls: Speculations on Literary Property in the
Library of the Future, 42 REPRESENTATIONS 53, 63 (1993).
49. See, e.g., Gomulkiewicz, supra note 41, at 901.
50. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights
Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 464-67 (1997).
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those injured by UCITA licenses may not have the means or will to undertake. 51
Many will simply be chilled from engaging in activities that would be deter-
mined legitimate had they been able to challenge a UCITA license term.  Par-
ents may blithely ignore the license term for the Adobe e-book version of Alice
in Wonderland that forbids reading the book aloud,52 but libraries have greater
reason to worry about the potential enforceability of such a term.
In contrast to UCITA, whose scope is presently restricted to transactions in
computer information,53 legislation proposed to protect the contents of data
compilations resembles the CTEA in affecting more than the digital public
domain.  Much of the rationale for such legislation relies, however, on the vul-
nerability of information in digital form to market-destructive appropriations,54
and this legislation would certainly affect the size and scope of the digital public
domain.  Under current U.S. law, neither unoriginal compilations nor the data
in original (and, hence, copyrightable) compilations is legally protectable unless
it is a trade secret or otherwise confidential.55  Several times in the past five
years, the U.S. Congress has considered legislation to protect the contents of
databases akin to measures adopted by the European Union in 1996.56  The EU
regime grants those who have invested substantial resources in making a data-
base fifteen years of exclusive rights to control the extraction and reuse of all or
substantial parts of the contents of that database.57  Database rights are renew-
able upon further expenditures of resources, and substantiality is to be judged
in qualitative as well as quantitative terms.58  The most recent EU-style database
bill introduced into the U.S. Congress was the CIAA.59
Although its sponsors characterize the CIAA as a regulation of unfair com-
petition,60 opponents characterize it as an intellectual property regime that is
unconstitutional, bad public policy, or both.61  The CIAA differs from the EU
51. See UCITA §105(b).
52. See Robert Menta, Read an E-book to Your Child, Go to Jail?, MP3.NEWSWIRE.NET, Dec. 26,
2002, at http://www.mp3newswire.net/stories/2000/ebook.html.
53. Drafters of this model legislation once intended it to regulate all transactions in information.
See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Kurt Opsahl, Licensing Information in the Global Information Market:
Freedom of Contract Meets Public Policy, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 386, 386 (1999) (discussing the
evolution of the scope of UCITA’s subject matter).
54. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND.
L. REV. 51, 64-76 (1997) (discussing the rationale for sui generis database legislation).
55. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1991).
56. See, e.g. J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent Devel-
opments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793, 799-812 (1999)
(discussing the DMCA and CIAA); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 54, at 102-09 (discussing data-
base bill).
57. EU Database Directive, art. 7, 10.
58. Id. art. 10.
59. H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999) (to be codified as 17 U.S.C. §§1401-1408); see also supra note 29
and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 106-349 (1999).
61. Professor Benkler considers the CIAA to be an intellectual property law rather than an unfair
competition law.  See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of
Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 535, 575-86 (2000).  Benkler concludes that the CIAA is unconstitutional.  Id. at 586-87; see also
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Directive in requiring proof of harm to actual or potential markets62 and in its
“reasonable use” limit on the liability of scientific and educational users for
extractions and uses of data in protected compilations,63 as well as in several
exemptions such as those for news reporting, verification, and genealogical
information.64  By conferring rights on compilers to control the use or extraction
of all or a substantial part of a collection of information that is the product of
substantial investment,65 however, the CIAA would substantially contract the
digital public domain—and not just as to items of information, but also as to
public domain works such as Shakespeare’s plays, which fall within the meaning
of “data” under the legislation.66  The main reason that the CIAA has not been
enacted is that organizations of scientists and a coalition of Internet-based
firms, prominently including Yahoo!, recognized the serious threats that the
CIAA posed to the digital public domain and mobilized against this legislation.67
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon, Congress has had other more urgent matters to consider, but like
the Terminator, the CIAA will almost certainly be back.
Although the CIAA and the EU database law pose substantial threats to
the digital public domain, more narrowly crafted legislation to protect data
compilations against market failures would not.  H.R. 1858 is the alternative bill
to the CIAA, considered during the same congressional session.68  It forbids
duplicating another firm’s database and then engaging in direct competition
with that firm.69  While this bill would, of course, affect the public domain, it
does so in a much narrower and more targeted way than the CIAA.  Assuming
there was persuasive evidence that market failures were occurring or imminent
in the database industry because firms were competitively duplicating existing
databases, this limitation on the reuse of public domain information would be
justifiable.70  This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?  Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce
Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47,
49-50 (1999) (arguing that database legislation is unconstitutional).  But see Jane C. Ginsburg, “No
Sweat?” Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Publications, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 338, 367-87 (1992) (arguing that database protection legislation would be constitu-
tional).  Whether EU-style legislation is a good idea as a matter of policy is a matter of heated debate.
Compare Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 54, at 55-57 (critical of EU-style legislation) and Reich-
man & Uhlir, supra note 56, at 799-812 (critical of EU-style legislation) with Ginsburg, supra, at 341
(supportive of EU-style legislation).
62. H.R. 354 §1402.
63. Id. §1403.
64. Id.
65. Id. § 1402.
66. Id. § 1401. The CIAA defines “information” as “facts, data, works of authorship, or any other
intangible material capable of being collected and organized in a systematic way.” Id.
67. See, e.g., Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 56, at 821.
68. H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999).
69. Id. § 102.
70. In previous work, I have expressed support for narrowly drawn database protection.  See
Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 54, at 55-57; see also Benkler, supra note 61, at 602-03 (concluding
that unfair competition legislation to protect data compilations would be constitutional); Reichman &
Uhlir, supra note 56, at 836-37 (endorsing an unfair competition approach to database protection).  In
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International News Service v. Associated Press, which held that INS had engaged
in unfair competition with the Associated Press (“AP”) when its reporters took
news from early editions of AP newspapers and published it verbatim in Inter-
national News Service (“INS”) papers that were in direct competition with AP
papers.71  The Supreme Court’s Feist decision may have said that “raw facts may
be copied at will,”72 but the Court qualified this statement with a reference to its
INS v. AP decision.73
The DMCA, like UCITA, principally aims to provide an extra layer of pro-
tection for commercially valuable digital information that is already protected
by intellectual property law.74  Like UCITA, the DMCA posits that private
firms are free to devise regulatory regimes that deviate from the default rules of
intellectual property law.75  The principal difference between UCITA and the
DMCA is that the DMCA’s extra layer of protection is focused on technical
measures used to protect digital information, whereas UCITA’s extra layer pro-
tects licenses.  Following on Lawrence Lessig’s insights,76 we might characterize
the DMCA as code (law) that reinforces code (program instructions) as code (a
private regulatory regime).  Hacking is the act of civil disobedience (or user
self-help) to which code as code is vulnerable.  This is why the DMCA makes it
illegal to “hack” certain technical measures and to make or distribute hacking
tools.77
Although not principally aimed at protecting public domain works, the
DMCA has significant implications for the digital public domain and for territo-
ries contiguous to the public domain.  Technical measures will be effective in
protecting public domain information as long as the vendor has the presence of
mind to use the same technical measure to protect digital versions of both
public domain and copyrighted works.78  Technical measures will, unless pro-
addition, I have endorsed a short term of anti-cloning protection for industrial compilations of applied
industrial know-how.  Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Com-
puter Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2413-18 (1994).  James Boyle, one of the strongest advocates
of the public domain, has also endorsed intellectual property protection for shamanic knowledge
(which U.S. law would likely consider to be in the public domain) to prevent unjust enrichment.  See
BOYLE, supra note 1, at 128-30.
71. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).  The Court’s decision is persuasive as a matter of unfair competition, but
has been widely criticized insofar as it relied on the existence of a “quasi-property” right in AP to stop
INS’s misappropriation.  See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and
the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 179-80 (1992); Pamela Samuelson, Information as Prop-
erty: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38
CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 388-95 (1989).
72. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991).
73. Id. at 353-54.
74. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 50, at 464-67; see also Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The
Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 559-
60 (1998).
76. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (2000) (discussing com-
puter program code as a regulatory regime).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
78. The implications of the DMCA rules for the public domain have been recognized by many
commentators.  See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 3, at 421; David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital
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grammed otherwise, persist after copyrights expire, thereby undermining new
entrants to the digital public domain.  Even if one could successfully argue that
bypassing an access control used to protect a public domain work was not
actionable under the DMCA’s anti-hacking rule (because that provision only
protects technical measures used by copyright owners to protect access to their
works),79 it would generally be necessary to build a tool to bypass any technical
measure that controls access to public domain and copyrighted information.
That tool would arguably be illegal under the DMCA because it would neces-
sarily enable bypassing of an access control protecting copyrighted works.80
Even Judge Lewis Kaplan, who found the application of the DMCA untrouble-
some as to Eric Corley’s posting of circumvention software on the Internet,
seemed somewhat concerned that the DMCA might be used to protect public
domain works in contravention to copyright policy.81
The more serious and immediate concern about the DMCA is not about its
implications for the public domain, but about its implications for territory con-
tiguous to the public domain, where fair use and other privileged acts have long
resided.82  Under existing law, technical measures do not need to be designed to
enable privileged uses, and few thus far deployed do so.83  For example, the
Content Scrambling System (“CSS”), the technical measure widely used to pro-
tect DVD movies, does not enable fair uses to be made; indeed, it does not even
permit users to skip through commercials included on the disk.
Debates have raged in the law review literature as to whether Congress
intended to preserve some room for fair uses under the DMCA and whether
the DMCA is constitutional to the extent they did not so intend.84  A substantial
Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 738-40 (2000); Hannibal Travis, Pirates of the
Information Infrastructure: Blackstonian Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
777, 861 (2000).
79. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
80. § 1201(a)(2).  See also §1201(b)(2) (outlawing making or distributing other anti-circumvention
tools).  The vendor of technically protected public domain works might not have standing to complain
about such a tool unless it used the same technical measure to protect works in which it did own copy-
rights.
81. Judge Kaplan stated:
 Moreover, the combination of such a work with a new preface or introduction might result in
a claim to copyright in the entire combination. If the combination then were released on DVD
and encrypted, the encryption would preclude access not only to the copyrighted new mate-
rial, but also to the public domain work. As the DMCA is not yet two years old, this does not
yet appear to be a problem, although it may emerge as one in the future.
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 338 n.245 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub
nom. Universal Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2nd Cir. 2001).
82. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, WIPO Treaty Implementation in the United States: Will Fair Use Sur-
vive?, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 236, 237-39 (1999); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and
the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need To Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 519, 557 (1999).
83. An exception is technically protected digital audio tapes which permit first generation digital
copies.  See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
84. Compare  Samuelson, supra note 82, at 537-41 (fair use preserved to some degree) and Jane C.
Ginsburg, From Owning Copies to Experiencing Works, in UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW (Hugh Hansen ed., forthcoming 2002) (fair use preserved to some degree; DMCA might be
unconstitutional without some fair use limitations) with Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The
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consensus exists among scholars that without some room for fair use hacking,
the DMCA would be unconstitutional.85  Federal judges, however, may be reluc-
tant to strike down the DMCA given the vulnerability of digital information
products to uncontrolled infringements.  They may be disinclined to second-
guess the congressional judgment that the DMCA is necessary to the survival of
the entertainment industry, exaggerated though this claim may be.
Senator Hollings has recently introduced a bill to mandate technical meas-
ures in every digital media device.86  The assumption underlying this legislation
seems to be that digital content cannot be protected effectively by software
because the software’s protections are too easy to hack, and the programs to
bypass them, even though illegal under the DMCA, can be distributed easily via
the Internet.87  Content will not really be secure until and unless hardware sys-
tems have embedded technical protections.  The Hollings bill would require all
digital media devices to comply with standard technical protection measures.88
In this respect, the Hollings bill resembles the Audio Home Recording Act
(“AHRA”), which requires vendors of consumer-grade digital audio taping
(“DAT”) technologies to install serial copy management system (“SCMS”)
chips that prevent the making of perfect digital copies of digital sound record-
ings.89  The AHRA represents a compromise between copyright owner and con-
sumer interests because the SCMS chip allows consumers to make usable first
generation copies of music, thereby allowing some fair uses of the music. 90  Any
copies made from those copies, however, degrade in quality.
The Hollings bill does not contain a similar compromise provision, and the
entertainment industry will undoubtedly resist efforts to add one.  If it is
enacted, the Hollings bill would have substantial implications for the public
domain and contiguous terrain.  Once technical protection measures are
embedded in hardware, hacking to release public domain information or to
enable fair or other privileged uses will become much more difficult than at pre-
sent—and indeed, that would seem to be the point of making systems more
secure.91  The computer industry has successfully opposed legislation that would
Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827, 880-88 (1998)
(fair use not preserved).
85. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 48; Glynn S. Lunney, The Death of Copyright: Digital Technol-
ogy, Private Copying and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 846-49 (2001); Neil
Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 37-42 (2001).
86. S. 2048, 107th Cong.  (2002).
87. See, e.g., DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 42, at 154-64.
88. Senate Bill 2048 would require the Federal Communications Commission to hold hearings
about standard technical measures that might be installed in digital media devices and to mandate that
future digital media devices install such technical measures.  See S. 2048 § 3.
89. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002.
90. Sellers of DAT machines and tapes must, however, make regular payments of two percent of
their sales to the U.S. Copyright Office to fund a royalty pool for compensating copyright owners for
personal use copying.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003-04.
91. See, e.g., Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights
Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137, 144-53 (1997).
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have required them to install copy-protection systems in the past,92 so they may
be allies of advocates of the digital public domain in lobbying against the
Hollings bill.
More likely, at least in the short run, is scaled-back legislation applicable to
consumer electronics equipment, but not (yet) to computers.  This would
address a key problem for the content industry: Manufacturers of consumer
electronics equipment want to make products that customers will be eager to
buy, and customers prefer technologies that enable them to copy and share digi-
tal content over those that lock the content down to one device.  Efforts, such as
the Secure Digital Music Initiative (“SDMI”), which aim to establish standards
that can be built into equipment or rendering software to technically protect
digital content, are not easy to bring to fruition because the content industry has
very different interests than the consumer electronics industry.93  Why waste all
that time, money, and energy in a long, drawn-out negotiation with a consumer
electronics industry that does not share your perspective on the need for techni-
cal protections, when generous campaign contributions and years of successful
lobbying experiences provide access to a group with a long history of sympa-
thizing with copyright industry concerns, namely the U.S. Congress?  If private
legislation proves unsuccessful, public legislation offers an alternative means to
the desired end.
Which among these three initiatives—UCITA, the CIAA, and the
DMCA/Hollings bill—poses the most serious threat to the digital public
domain?  Each is a serious threat in its own right, but more significant are the
potential synergies among them, assuming all are enacted in the form currently
proposed and are deemed constitutional.  Any compilation of digital informa-
tion protectable by the CIAA may also be protected by a UCITA license and
by a technical protection measure capable of enforcing any restriction imposed
on the digital information and legally validated by the DMCA and the CIAA.
Even if the CIAA exempts “reasonable uses” from liability, such uses may be
thwarted by the terms of a UCITA license or by a technical measure controlling
what the user can and cannot do with the information.
As between UCITA licenses and technical measures (backed up by the
DMCA), the more significant threat to the digital public domain and to reason-
able uses of digital information would seem to be from technical measures.
Secure systems do not allow reasonable uses to be made of protected digital
information unless those uses have been authorized, whereas one can always
ignore a UCITA license provision purporting to override rights to use informa-
tion arising under other laws or challenge its enforceability in a legal proceed-
ing.  A person who makes reasonable uses of UCITA protected information in
breach of the license can at least argue that the license term interferes with fed-
92. See, e.g., News Release, Computer & Communications Industry Association, Hollywood’s
Copy-Control Proposal Will Harm Industry and Betray Consumers (June 4, 2002), available at http://
www.ccianet.org/press/02/0604.php3.
93. See supra note 32.
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eral intellectual property policy and should be preempted, is a misuse of intel-
lectual property rights, is a fair breach of the license, or is unconscionable.94
Ignoring a technical measure will be ineffectual because it will simply enforce
the licensor’s rules regardless of what the law says.  A legal challenge to a tech-
nical measure that interferes with reasonable uses, given early court interpreta-
tions of the DMCA, is unlikely to succeed or be cost-effective.  Some scholars
have endorsed “self-help” measures by users to preserve the public domain or
have argued for changes to the DMCA, making anti-circumvention protections
only available to copyright owners who had escrowed keys to unlock technical
measures and get access to the blocked material.95
Although the Internet was initially constructed as an open information envi-
ronment, it is capable, as Lawrence Lessig has pointed out, of evolving into an
architecture of perfect control.96  The DMCA and the Hollings bill are elements
of a legal infrastructure to support such a secure technical infrastructure.  Gov-
ernments and commercial entities may prefer architectures of control to archi-
tectures of openness.97  Although the reasons for their preferences may differ,
their goals may converge sufficiently to make governments and commercial
entities allies in insisting on greater control over the online environment.  This
would diminish the digital public domain.
As between UCITA and the CIAA, it is difficult to say which would have
the most harmful effects on the digital public domain.  The CIAA would have a
more immediate impact on this domain because it would propertize collections
of digital information across the board.  Analysts who have studied the CIAA’s
exceptions and limitations do not believe they adequately protect the public
interest.98  It is possible, of course, that courts will construe the exceptions and
limitations more generously than intended in order to comport with constitu-
tional requirements.99  The CIAA has not yet been enacted and may evolve into
a more balanced piece of legislation in response to criticisms leveled at highly
protectionist versions of the bill.100  UCITA does not directly diminish the public
domain; it only presumptively validates license terms that implicate the public
domain and adjacent terrain.  The harm UCITA may do to the digital public
94. See sources cited supra notes 34, 44; J. H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legis-
lated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Informa-
tion, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875 (1999).
95. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Copyright Management
Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 54-65 (2001); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of
Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089, 1137-42 (1998).
96. LESSIG, supra note 76, at 6-7.
97. Id. at 54-60.  Governments may want more control over the Internet in order to stop gambling
or to protect children from patently offensive materials; commercial firms may want more controls over
the Internet in order to protect commercial transactions.
98. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 61, at 583-84; Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 56, at 811-12.
99. If, for example, an historian of the Vietnam War extracted and used a substantial quantum of
data from a compilation of data about weaponry of that war, a court might consider the First Amend-
ment as a limiting principle on CIAA liability.
100. See, e.g., Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 56, at 823-28 (regarding Senator Hatch’s discussion
draft of database legislation).
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domain is more likely to occur indirectly from the manner in which information
providers license information and the extent to which they enforce license limi-
tations.  The same may be true for the DMCA.  How much harm it ultimately
does to the digital public domain and contiguous terrain depends in large part
on how copyright owners deploy technically protected products in the market-
place and the extent to which courts limit uses (if they limit uses) of the DMCA
against liberators of public domain information or fair users.
Threats to the digital public domain should also be gauged in terms of the
statutes’ likelihood of enactment and success.  The CTEA constitutes the most
substantial threat to the digital public domain because it has already been
enacted and, thus far, has successfully blocked works from entering the public
domain.  The DMCA’s anti-circumvention rules are also in effect, and its anti-
tool rules have so far withstood constitutional challenges.101  In the years since
its initial promulgation, UCITA has been enacted in two states.102  It has met
with resistance in several state legislatures, and its future is clouded because of
the controversies surrounding it.  As noted above, Congress has not adopted
the CIAA, although the House of Representatives passed it twice in 1998.103
Compromise legislation may be necessary to attain enactment, and this would
presumably limit the damage that the CIAA would do to the digital public
domain.  The Hollings bill has very little immediate chance of passage, but it is
an ominous portent for the future.
As for private initiatives, DVD-CCA has, through a complex licensing
arrangement, successfully ensured that all DVD players sold in the United
States. and elsewhere have technical measures embedded in them.  The huge
success of the DVD movie market shows that the content industry’s fond hope
that consumers will buy technically protected content once they get used to it
may have some chance of being actualized.  The overwhelming majority of
movies distributed on DVDs are works in copyright, not public domain works.
Although the impact on the digital public domain from CSS-protected DVDs is
consequently limited, impacts on fair uses are considerable.  SDMI has been
unsuccessful as a recording industry initiative to ensure secure content and
secure players, but there is every reason to believe that the major players in the
sound recording industry will move forward with distributing technically pro-
tected content.  The major players are, moreover, aggressively challenging
through litigation a range of technologies they perceive as threats to their inter-
ests.  MP3 files of commercial sound recordings and technologies for distribut-
101. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d
sub nom. Universal Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001); Real Networks, Inc. v. Steam-
box, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
102. The states that have enacted UCITA are Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. tit. 59.1 §501.1-509.2, and
Maryland, MD. CODE. ANN., tit. 22 §101-816.
103. The House version of the legislation that became the DMCA included the CIAA.  However,
because the Senate had not given due consideration to the CIAA or similar legislation at that point and
because of non-consensus about such legislation, the Senate would not agree to the inclusion of the
CIAA in the DMCA.  See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 56, at 829-30.
